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Abstract
Analysis of ﬁscal policy changes using general equilibrium models with forward-
looking agents typically requires the modeler to assume a counterfactual adjustment
to some ﬁscal instrument in order to achieve the debt sustainability implied by the
government's intertemporal budget constraint. Since the ﬁscal instrument chosen
to close the model can induce economic behavior unrelated to the policy change in
models where Ricardian Equivalence does not hold, noise may be introduced into
the analysis. In this paper we use such an overlapping generations framework to
examine the impact of alternative ﬁscal closing assumptions on projected changes
to economic aggregates over the ten-year `budget window' following a change in tax
policy, assessing the extent to which the noise associated with a particular ﬁscal in-
strument can be mitigated. We ﬁnd that while quantitative diﬀerences in projected
macroeconomic activity can be observed across alternative ﬁscal instruments, these
diﬀerences tend to shrink as the date that ﬁscal instruments begin to adjust is
delayed into the future. Since the particular ﬁscal instrument chosen to achieve
debt sustainability can then become relatively unimportant, the reliability of policy
analysis obtained using this class of models may be improved.
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1 Introduction
General-equilibrium models with forward-looking, rational agents have become a work-
horse for analyzing the macroeconomic eﬀects of federal ﬁscal policy proposals over the
`budget window' both within government and private research institutions.1 Obtaining a
solution to these models, however, typically requires the modeler to assume adjustments
to ﬁscal policy counterfactual to the proposal in order to keep public debt on the sustain-
able path implied by the government's intertemporal budget constraint. Auerbach (2005),
Gale and Samwick (2014), Elmendorf (2015), and Auerbach et al. (2017) emphasize that
these ﬁscal closing assumptions may induce economic behavior unrelated to the policy
proposal, as the models typically used for policy analysis do not exhibit the Ricardian
Equivalence property. While Diamond and Moomau (2003), Altshuler et al. (2005), CBO
(2005), JCT (2006a), and JCT (2006b) provide evidence that budget-window projections
of macroeconomic activity following a tax policy change are sensitive to alternative ﬁs-
cal instruments used for the closing assumption, there is little evidence that exists to
show how well the the within-budget-window noise associated with a particular ﬁscal
instrument can be mitigated.
The purpose of this paper is both to provide a quantitative assessment of the within-
budget-window eﬀects associated with alternative ﬁscal instruments used in practice, and
to explore the extent to which the associated noise can be mitigated. We examine the
eﬀects associated with choosing lump-sum transfer payments as the ﬁscal instrument for
adjustment as in Zodrow and Diamond (2013), non-valued government consumption as
in DeBacker et al. (2018) and Page and Smetters (2016), or a combination of both as in
Moore and Pecoraro (2018). We do so using the overlapping generations model of Moore
and Pecoraro (2018) (MP-OLG), a framework which shares core properties common to
other models used for policy analysis, including the absence of Ricardian Equivalence.
In our analysis, we repeatedly simulate a tax policy change, each time varying only
the ﬁscal instrument and implementation timing of the closing assumption. We ﬁnd that
while quantitative diﬀerences in key macroeconomic aggregates and prices projected over
the budget window can be observed across alternative ﬁscal instruments, these diﬀer-
ences tend to shrink as the closing date is delayed. The choice of a ﬁscal instrument
to be used for adjustment therefore becomes less important for the analysis, given that
debt is on a sustainable path, because forward-looking agents discount the future when
making current decisions. To the extent that the counterfactual eﬀects associated with
the particular ﬁscal instruments used in the closing assumption are mitigated in practice,
the reliability of policy analysis obtained using this class of models may be improved.
2 Fiscal Sustainability
2.1 The Government's Budget Constraint
In the class of dynamic general equilibrium models with rational, forward-looking agents,
the government typically faces a recursive budget constraint of the form:
TRt +Gt = Tt +Bt+1 − (1 + ρt)Bt (2.1)
1The `budget window' is the immediate ten-year period over which budgetary eﬀects of United States
federal policy changes are currently measured. For analyses of the recently enacted PL 115-97 `Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act' using such models, see JCT (2017), PWBM (2017), and DeBacker et al. (2018).
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where TRt denotes net transfers to households, Gt is government consumption expendi-
tures, Tt is tax revenue, and Bt is the stock of public debt which is serviced at rate
of interest ρt. Equation (2.1) determines the path of debt for a given sequence of
{TRt+i, Gt+i, Tt+i, ρt+i}∞i=0. Since forward-looking agents condition on this information
when making current decisions, public debt must be on `sustainable' path such that the
sequence of revenues and outlays allow for the debt to be serviced over an inﬁnite horizon.
Budgetary implications associated with a sustainable debt path can be shown by per-
forming recursive substitutions of equation (2.1) and allowing time to approach inﬁnity:
lim
k→∞
k−1∑
i=0
(
TRt+i +Gt+i∏i
s=0(1 + ρt+s)
)
= lim
k→∞
k−1∑
i=0
(
Tt+i∏i
s=0(1 + ρt+s)
)
−Bt + lim
k→∞
Bt+k∏k−1
s=0(1 + ρt+s)
Ruling out explosive debt paths requires:
lim
k→∞
Bt+k∏k−1
s=0(1 + ρt+s)
= 0 (2.2)
so that debt cannot indeﬁnitely grow at rate larger than its rate of interest along any
sustainable debt path. Satisfaction of the no-Ponzi condition (2.2) implies the following
intertemporal government budget constraint:
∞∑
i=0
(
TRt+i +Gt+i∏i
s=0(1 + ρt+s)
)
=
∞∑
i=0
(
Tt+i∏i
s=0(1 + ρt+s)
)
−Bt (2.3)
Although the government's budget can be in total deﬁcit or surplus in any given period
post-reform, equation (2.3) implies that the present discounted value of tax receipts net
of the debt position at time t must be suﬃcient to ﬁnance the present discounted value
of outlays in any feasible equilibrium.
2.2 The Fiscal Closing Assumption
A non-revenue-neutral tax policy change will alter the present discounted value of re-
ceipts on the right-hand side of equation (2.3). If the policy-induced change to cumulative
deﬁcits implies that debt will indeﬁnitely grow at a rate larger than its rate of interest
and therefore violate equation (2.2), there must be a compensating adjustment to some
ﬁscal instrument so that equation (2.3) holds. While this adjustment may in principle
occur through any ﬁscal instrument available to the government, it is common in practice
for the modeler to choose either lump-sum transfers, non-valued government consump-
tion expenditures, or some combination of the two. This involves the re-speciﬁcation of
{TRt+i, Gt+i}∞i=0 post-reform in some fashion not speciﬁed in the actual policy proposal
under analysis.
A change to either ﬁscal instrument for purposes of achieving debt sustainability will
be internalized by all agents either directly through their individual budget constraint,
or indirectly through general equilibrium, and thereby introduce counterfactual behavior
into the analysis: A change in transfer payments will alter the present discounted value of
lifetime net income expected by those households receiving them in the initial equilibrium.
This may introduce a non-negligible income eﬀect to these households, who would respond
by altering their savings or labor supply plans. A change in government expenditures,
on the other hand, will alter the quantity of ﬁnal goods purchased. This may induce a
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non-negligible change in the rate of capital accumulation, as ﬁrms would desire to use a
diﬀerent quantity of capital in combination with labor when production levels change in
response to the change in government expenditures. Thus, the projected macroeconomic
activity over the budget window will therefore depend not only on the tax policy being
modeled, but also on the counterfactual ﬁscal closing assumption chosen.
3 Simulations
3.1 Model and Policy Experiment
The MP-OLG model is a large-scale overlapping generations model developed speciﬁcally
for the macroeconomic analysis of tax policy proposals.2 It shares characteristics common
to general equilibrium models of this class: Finitely-lived corhots households make labor
supply, saving, and consumption choices, discounting utility generated by future choices
relative to current choices. Firms demand labor and business capital each period for
production and sale of an output good that can be transformed by households into a
consumable good or a ﬁnancial asset. Taxes are collected on income by a government and,
along with public bond issues, are used to ﬁnance expenditures and transfer payments.
Using the MP-OLG model, we repeat a tax policy change performed in Moore and
Pecoraro (2018): We simulate a permanent ten-percent reduction in the United States
federal statutory tax rates applied to ordinary income which includes wage income,
interest income, short-term capital gains, nonqualiﬁed dividends, and pass-through busi-
ness income relative to 2018 present tax law, assuming that any expiring tax provisions
in our baseline are permanent. The conventional revenue eﬀect amounts to slightly less
than 0.8% per year over 2019-2028.3 The policy change is unanticipated by agents, after
which time all agents are assumed to have perfect foresight regarding both future ﬁscal
policy and economic conditions. We repeatedly simulate this reform, varying only the
ﬁscal instrument and implementation timing of the closing assumption imposed: Ad-
justments using 100% lump-sum transfer payments and 100% non-valued government
consumption expenditures are made in turn contemporaneously with reform in year 1, as
well as in post-reform years 11, 21, and 31. In each case, we allow adjustment to occur
in a linearly decreasing fashion over ten years following the speciﬁed closing date.
3.2 Results and Discussion
Tables 1 and 2 show the responses of key macroeconomic variables due to the tax policy
change where lump-sum transfer payments and non-valued government consumption ex-
penditures are used in turn as the ﬁscal instrument for adjustment. These responses are
expressed as average annual percent changes relative to the present-law baseline over the
ten-year budget window. For ease of comparison, we highlight cases where these absolute
diﬀerences are greater than 0.1 percentage points.
We note two important patterns: First, the response of aggregates are qualitatively
consistent across all eight ﬁscal closing assumptions. In each case, the policy change is
shown to increase economic activity in labor, capital, and product markets while generat-
ing a large revenue loss. Second, there are large quantitative diﬀerences in the response of
2See Moore and Pecoraro (2018) for a detailed description of the model and calibration.
3The conventional revenue eﬀect is the estimated change in tax receipts from those projected under a
present law baseline forecast, holding constant gross national product. See JCT (2011) for more details.
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aggregates across ﬁscal instruments when the ﬁscal closing assumption is imposed shortly
after the policy change, such as in years 1 and 11.
The substantial quantitative diﬀerences across ﬁscal instruments described above arise
because each particular ﬁscal instrument introduces counterfactual behavior into the anal-
ysis. Consider the results in Table 1 where transfer payments to households decrease to
stabilize the path of debt: Eﬀective labor supply is relatively high due to an income
eﬀect as there is an expected reduction in households' present discounted value of life-
time net income. Since this raises the marginal product of capital, more business capital
investment occurs. As a result, aggregate output increases by relatively more when ﬁscal
closing is imposed in earlier years than in later years. Similarly, consider the results in
Table 2 where government consumption expenditures decrease to achieve ﬁscal sustain-
ability: The increase in business capital is relatively smaller, which reﬂects the reduction
in expected production in response to less government purchases of ﬁnal goods.
Our main ﬁnding, evident from a comparison of Tables 1 and 2, is that the diﬀerent
eﬀects associated with each ﬁscal instrument tend to weaken within the ten-year budget
window the further that the ﬁscal closing date is pushed into the future. This result occurs
because households who discount future utility give less weight to the eﬀects of future
ﬁscal policy when making current decisions, and zero weight to eﬀects occurring after their
lifetime. As the ﬁscal closing date is delayed, provided debt remains on a sustainable path,
the eﬀects idiosyncratic to each particular ﬁscal instrument are quantitatively mitigated
over the budget window.
There are limitations to the length of time that the ﬁscal closing date can be delayed,
thereby mitigating the noise associated with the closing assumption, as there must be
suﬃcient resources available to return debt to a sustainable path. For example, using
the MP-OLG model, we cannot simulate the policy analyzed here while imposing ﬁscal
closing in year 41 with either ﬁscal instrument. As the model is calibrated to target
the relative size of present-law U.S. federal tax revenues, net transfer payments, public
investment, as well as public debt and debt servicing costs in the initial baseline, there
is not a suﬃcient level of transfers or government consumption expenditures available to
return public debt to a sustainable path following four decades of debt ﬁnancing for this
particularly large policy change. For this reason, the extent to which ﬁscal closing can
be delayed is both model- and policy-speciﬁc.
Finally, as an alternative to using 100% transfer payments or government consumption
as the ﬁscal instrument for adjustment, we also report results using both ﬁscal instru-
ments simultaneously in Table 3 where each instrument ﬁnances half of the necessary
adjustment. Cases where the absolute diﬀerence from the corresponding average of the
two previous alternatives is greater than 0.1 percentage points are highlighted in gray.
Our results show that, when imposed at a given time after the budget window, this hybrid
ﬁscal closing assumption generates aggregate responses that are good approximations of
a simple average of the alternative two assumptions. Since the ﬁscal instrument to be
used in the future to maintain debt sustainability is often unknown a priori when policy
changes are analyzed, this relationship provides support for use of the hybrid ﬁscal closing
assumption as a reasonable alternative in practice.
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4 Conclusion
This paper has examined the eﬀects of diﬀerent ﬁscal closing assumptions on budget-
window projections of macroeconomic activity following a change in tax policy, assessing
the eﬀects to which the noise associated with the particular ﬁscal instrument chosen
for adjustment to maintain a sustainable debt path can be mitigated. Focusing on two
ﬁscal instruments commonly-used to balance the government's budget in the long run,
lump-sum transfer payments and government consumption expenditures, we have found
that quantitative diﬀerences in projected aggregates across instruments tend to shrink as
the ﬁscal closing date is delayed. This result implies that the choice of ﬁscal instrument
used to achieve the debt sustainability implied by the government's intertemporal budget
constraint becomes less important for the quantitative analysis as the closing date is
pushed further into the future.
The mechanism which underlies our ﬁndings depends on the behavior of forward-
looking, rational agents who discount future utility. Since agents with these character-
istics are typically present in other macroeconomic models used for policy analysis that
require a ﬁscal closing assumption, we expect these ﬁndings to generalize. To the extent
that the counterfactual eﬀects associated with the choice of a particular ﬁscal instrument
used to close the model are mitigated, the reliability of budget-window analyses produced
by this class of models may be improved.
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Table 1: Fiscal Closing with Lump-Sum Transfers
Year Fiscal Closing Imposed
10-year Average Annual
Percent Change Relative
to Present-Law Baseline 1 11 21 31
Aggregates
Output 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3
Business Capital Stock 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.7
Eﬀective Labor Supply 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6
Market Consumption -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Housing Capital Stock -0.5 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4
Federal Tax Revenue -2.7 -2.9 -3.0 -3.1
Prices
Real Return to Capital -0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Real Wage Rate -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Table 2: Fiscal Closing with Government Expenditures
Year Fiscal Closing Imposed
10-year Average Annual
Percent Change Relative
to Present-Law Baseline 1 11 21 31
Aggregates
Output 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3
Business Capital Stock 1.3 0.7 0.7 0.7
Eﬀective Labor Supply 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.5
Market Consumption -0.0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2
Housing Capital Stock -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5
Federal Tax Revenue -3.0 -3.0 -3.1 -3.0
Prices
Real Return to Capital -0.1 0.4 0.4 0.3
Real Wage Rate -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
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Table 3: Fiscal Closing with 50% Lump-Sum Transfers and 50% Government Expenditures
Year Fiscal Closing Imposed
10-year Average Annual
Percent Change Relative
to Present-Law Baseline 1 11 21 31
Aggregates
Output 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.3
Business Capital Stock 1.4 0.9 0.8 0.8
Eﬀective Labor Supply 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6
Market Consumption -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2
Housing Capital Stock -0.5 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4
Federal Tax Revenue -2.6 -3.1 -3.0 -3.0
Prices
Real Return to Capital -0.0 0.3 0.4 0.4
Real Wage Rate -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Highlighted cells indicate an absolute diﬀerence greater than 0.1%
from the corresponding average of the two alternatives
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